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Money Laundering:
The American Law and
Its Global Influence
Matthew S Morgan'
At the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations on October 22, 1995, President
Clinton outlined the initiatives of Presidential Decision Directive No. 42, aimed at combating
transnational crime.2 In his speech, the President asserted: "I directed our government to
identify and put on notice nations that tolerate money laundering. Criminal enterprises are
moving vast sums of il-gotten gains through the international financial system with absolute
impunity. We must not allow them to wash the blood off profits from the sale of drugs, from
terror or organized crime."3 President Clinton further urged members of the United
Nations to: "join in negotiating and endorsing a declaration on international crime and citi-
zen safety, a declaration which would first indude a no-sanctuary pledge, so that we could
say together to organized criminals, terrorists, drug traffickers and smugglers, you have
nowhere to run and nowhere to hide."4 Perhaps indicative of the President's ability to say
the right thing at the right time, this statement adequately captures the urgency with which
the United States is treating organized crime and the international character that such activi-
ties (notably, money laundering) have assumed.
The United States anxiety over the illegal narcotics trade and money laundering is appro-
priate. Not only is the United States primarily responsible for the behemoth that is the drug
trade, the U.S. dollar has become the preferred currency of the industry and is inextricably
intertwined with money laundering activities. Estimates are that global money laundering
activities yield upwards of US $500 billion annually.5 Federal law enforcement officials in the
1. Matthew S. Morgan, Research Fellow, London Institute of International Banking, Finance nd
Development Law, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, Queen Mary and Westfield College,
University of London.
2. See International Banking and Organized Crime: Hearing before the House Comm.on Banking and
Financial Services, 103rd Cong. (1996) (statement of Stanley E. Morris, Director, Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)), available in 1996 WL 7136348.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See generally Money Laundering: A Framework for Understanding U.S. Efforts Overseas, West's
Legal News, May 24, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 412976; International Conferences
Pledge to Crackdown on Money Laundering, West's Legal News, Nov. 26, 1996, available in WEST-
LAW, 1996 WL 677946. In February 1996, the Vienna-based International Narcotics Control
Board stated that "[e]stimates are in the order of several hundred billions of dollars a year and
exceed the gross national product (GNP) of most countries.' Quoted in Thalif Deen, U.S. Rejects
Convention to Fight Money Laundering, INTER PRESS SERV., June 28, 1996, available in 1996 WL
10767896; see also International Narcotics Control: House Comm. on International Relations,
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United States calculate that between $100 billion and $300 billion in U.S. currency is involved
in money laundering each year.6 In the cash societies of some of the Lesser Developed
Countries, the U.S. dollar, and not the drugs, has become the commodity of choice.7 The vast
amounts of dollars flowing through the international pipeline, as well as the dramatic increase
in U.S. currency counterfeiting, have created an omnipresence for the U.S. dollar that the
Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury could never have anticipated or desired.8
In addition, the United States represents the single largest consumer market for illegal
narcotics.9 Estimates are that 65 percent of the world's production of illegal drugs is used
by U.S. consumers.10 In 1991 the Drug Enforcement Agency found U.S. citizens expended
more on drugs and drug prevention, rehabilitation, and education than on national
defense.II The American appetite for illegal drugs is fed primarily from foreign countries,
with an estimated 95 percent of the supply coming from abroad.12 Thus, to wage a suc-
cessful attack on money laundering and drug trafficking, domestic measures are just not
enough. An international effort is needed to address the problem. 13
With both the incentive to implement a widely-recognized legal regime on money
laundering and the experience of drafting illegal narcotics legislation (gained during its
long-standing War Against Drugs), the United States has been instrumental in pushing
forward international initiatives. One of the earliest multilateral agreements joined by the
United States was the Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
102nd Cong.(1995)(Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State); Lisa A. Barbot, Money
Laundering: An International Challenge, 3 TUL J. INT'L & COMP. L. 161, 199-200 (1995).
6. John J. Fialka, Chinese Puzzle Uncovered by Australian Team's Software, WALL ST. J., May 8, 1995,
available in 1995 WL-WSJ 8709491.
7. David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in




11. Sharon A. Gardener, A Global Initiative to Deter Drug Trafficking: Will Internationalizing the Drug
War Work?, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 287,288 n.5 (1993).
12. Id.
13. The U.S. interests in waging an international attack on money laundering are probably two-
dimensional. From a strictly domestic standpoint, the United States has an interest in develop-
ing an international anti-money laundering framework to deny the drug trade a realization of its
profits, thereby removing an incentive for production. In addition, the United States also believes
money laundering is a threat to the stability and economic development of its neighbors and
trading partners. To this point, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) has stated:
Criminal Activities, without restraint, fundamentally destabilize political and economic
reform. As history demonstrates again and again, political stability, democracy and free
markets depend on solvent, stable, and honest financial, commercial, and trade systems..
.. As organized crime develops economic power, it corrupts democratic institutions and
undermines free enterprise. Money laundering is now being viewed as the central dilem-
ma in dealing with all forms of international organized crime because financial gain
means power. Organized crime is assuming anincreasingly significant role that threatens
the safety and security of peoples, states and democratic institutions.
FinCEN, The Global Fight Against Money Laundering: What Steps Are Being Taken By The United
States To Address The Problem Of International Organized Crime?
<http:l/www.ustreas.gov/treasurylbureaus/fincenlborder.html#fatf>.
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Psychotropic Substances of 1988 (Vienna Convention).1 4 Coming into force on
November 1, 1990, this treaty attempted to establish a flexible foundation upon which a
consensus condemning money laundering could be built. 15 Importantly, the Vienna
Convention obligated the signatories to criminalize the laundering of drug money under
their respective domestic laws, provided for the confiscation (i.e., freezing, seizing, and for-
feiting) of property involved in or derived from such offenses, established drug money
laundering as grounds for extradition among countries, and initiated a process for mutal
legal assistance among countries in order to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of
those involved in laundering the proceeds of the drug trade. 16
Unique in its novelty (as well as in its substance), the Vienna Convention served as the
basis for subsequent intergovernmental initiatives -- such as the G-7 Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) and the model legislation adopted by the Inter-American Drug Abuse
Control Commission of the Organization of American States (OAS). 17 Important for the
purposes of this article, the United States was active in the negotiation of the Vienna
Convention and, accordingly, the money laundering legislation in the United States is
largely reflected not only in the Convention, but also in its progeny.18 This article's
premise is that an understanding of the international framework for combating money
laundering begins with a review of U.S. law, including its current mandates, its founda-
tions, and its future. An analysis of the application of U.S. money laundering law to for-
eigners will follow, with a comparison of U.S. law to the initiatives of the FATF and the
OAS rounding out the article.
I. The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.
The inception of U.S. legislative efforts to address money laundering activities can be
traced to the enactment of the Bank Records and Foreign Transactions Act in 1970.19
Titles I and II of this legislation, commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), pro-
vided the foundation upon which subsequent U.S. money laundering legislation was con-
structed and, as such, effectively represent the cornerstone of the American effort to thwart
these types of activities.20 Over the past twenty-six years, the BSA continuously evolved to
address the advancements in money laundering sophistication, financial innovation, and
14. United Nations: Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1990). Another early multi-
lateral initiative entered into by the United States was the 1988 Basle Committee on Banking
Regulations and Supervisory Practices' Statement of Principles on Money Laundering (Basle
Statment of Principles). Basle Committee on Banking Supervision: Prevention of Criminal Use of
The Banking System for the Purpose of Money-Laundering, BDIEL, Dec. 1988, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, BDIEL File. The Basle Statement of Principles recommended financial institutions
fully identify customers, comply with the laws set out to combat money laundering, and cooper-
ate with law enforcement officials to help ferret out money launderers. Id.
15. 1Ld
16. See Stewart, supra note 7, at 387-88.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 388.
19. 31 U.S.C.§ 5311 (1995).
20. See id
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technological knowledge.21 Indeed, a historical review of money laundering in the United
States reveals a chess game pitting those seeking to launder illicit monies against those
seeking to stop them.
22
The stated purpose of the BSA is "to require certain reports or records where they
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceed-
ings."23 The statute does not impose the reporting and recording requirements itself, how-
ever. Rather, the statute serves as an enabling device explicitly authorizing the Secretary of
the Treasury to fashion appropriate regulatory measures to meet the ends set forth by the
BSA. As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the BSA's "civil and criminal penalties attach
only upon violation of regulations promulgated by the Secretary [of the Treasury]; if the
Secretary were to do nothing, the Act itself would impose no penalties on anyone."24
The most important provisions of the BSA's original reporting requirements, as pro-
mulgated through U.S. Treasury regulations, are the mandatory filings of Currency
Transaction Reports (CTRs) and Reports of International Transportation of Currency or
Monetary Instruments (CMIRs). 25 In short, these two filings respectively cover transac-
tions and transportations in amounts exceeding US $10,000.
A. THE CURRENCY TRANSACTION REPoRT (CTR).
A financial institution (other than a casino or the Postal Service) is required to file a
CTR, or an I.R.S. Form 4789, for "each deposit, withdrawal, exchange of currency or other
payment or transfer, by, through, or to such financial institution which involves a transac-
tion in currency if more than $10,000."26 Among the entities included on the definitional
laundry list of "financial institution[s]", and thus affected by the reporting requirements,
are insured banks, private bankers, agencies or branches of foreign banks in the United
States, insurance companies, pawnbrokers, travel agencies, and dealers in precious
stones. 27 The CTR filing period afforded these financial institutions is fifteen days upon
the completion of the transaction.
21. Whether the evolution of the money launderer has been a product of legislative attack or simply
reflective of the age of technology in which we live (or both) is a matter for debate.
22. Cite
23. 31 U.S.C. § 5311. In drafting the BSA, Congress was concerned with two major issues as they
related to the enforcement of the U. S. regulatory, tax, and criminal laws. The first issue was the
maintenance of accurate and adequate records and the reporting of especially suspect monetary
transactions by domestic financial institutions. In addition, the legislators were perplexed over
the widespread use of foreign financial institutions in countries with strict secrecy laws for the
purpose of evading U.S. laws. See California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,26-27 (1974).
24. California Bankers Ass'n., 416 U.S. at 26.
25. See 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1995). Other filings required under the BSA include the Currency
Transaction Report by Casinos or an I.R.S. Form 8362, which essentially imposes the require-
ments of the CTR on a casino constituency, 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(a)(2) (1995), and the Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) filing for U.S. persons or entities holding bank accounts
abroad, 31 C.ER. § 103.27(c)(1989), providing that if a foreign bank account maintained by a
U.S. person or business exceeds US $10,000 at any time, a filing of a FBAR or a U.S. Treasury
Department Form TDF 90-22.1 must be made by the following June 30th. Id
26. 31 C.F.R.§ 103.22(a)(1) (1995).
27. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) (1995).
28 NAFTA. Law and Business Review of the Americas
B. THE REPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION OF CURRENCY OR
MONETARY INSTRUMENTS (CMIR).
The other major reporting requirement under the BSA is the CMIR or a Customs
Form 4790.29 The CMIR must be filed by one who: (i) "physically transports, mails, or
ships, or causes to be physically transported, mailed or shipped,. . . currency or other
monetary instruments in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 at any one time" from
or to any place within the United States30 or (ii) receives currency or other monetary
instruments "in an aggregate amount exceeding $10,000 at one time. . . from any place
outside the United States with respect to which a report has not been filed."31 Treasury
regulations define currency as including coin and paper money from any country.32
Monetary instruments encompass travelers' checks, negotiable instruments, investment
securities, money orders, and other similar instruments. 33 Finally, "at one time" is defined
as including not only those transportations occurring on a single calendar day, but also
those occurring over a period of one or more days if the transportation was intentionally
drawn out to avoid the applicable reporting requirements. 34 At the latest, CMIRs must be
filed within fifteen days either of transportation into or out of the United States or of the
receipt of the currency or other monetary instrument. 35
II. The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (MLCA).
The effect of the BSA in the first decade and a half of its enactment was minimal. The
Act's failings, however, did not lie primarily in its objective or approach; the principal rea-
son for the Act's ineffectiveness was in its application. Quite simply, the U.S. Treasury had
not placed enough emphasis on the enforcement of the BSA reporting requirements. 36
28. 31 C.F.R. § 103.27(a)(1) (1995).
29. 31 C.F.RI § 103.23 (1995).
30. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(a) (1995).
31. 31 C.F.R. § 103.23(b) (1995).
32. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(e) (1995).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3) (1995); See also 31 C.F.R. § 103.1 1(u)(1). Specifically not included within
the definition are warehouse receipts or bills of lading. See id. at § 103.1 l(u)(2).
34. 31 C.F.R.§ 103.11(a)(6) (1995).
35. Id. at § 103.27(b)(1)-(2).
36. Quoting General Accounting Office testimony, Senator Joseph Biden, Jr. stated in a 1985 Senate
Judiciary Committee hearing that the Treasury:
[g]ave relatively low priority to Bank Secrecy Act compliance when applying examina-
tion resources, being concerned primarily with other mission-related objectives; lacked
detailed procedures, or applied existing procedures inconsistently; failed to adequately
document the work performed, so that often neither we nor they could ascertain how
well examiners were performing the compliance examinations, and failed to designate
examiners with a wide range of experience and training to assure compliance with the
Act, and could better communicate and coordinate withone another and thereby
enhance the overall compliance.
Money Laundering Legislation: Hearihg on S. 572, S. 1335, and S. 1385 Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 90 (1985) (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden, Jr.).
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In February 1985 the U.S. Treasury abandoned its previous ambivalence toward
enforcement, heralding a new era of diligence with the Bank of Boston case. The U.S.
Treasury fined the Bank of Boston $500,000 for failing to report more than 1100 different
transactions totaling over US $1.6 billion, thereby effectively placing the rest of the bank-
ing industry on notice that compliance with the BSA had gained new importance. 37 As
other fines were levied, the American public became increasingly more suspicious about
banking industry practices. The public clamor, sparked in large measure by the ambitious-
ness of the American press in reporting the shortcomings of the banking industry, piqued
the interest of U.S. lawmakers.38 In the ensuing Congressional hearings, it became evident
the requirements of the BSA were not effectively putting an end to money laundering
through financial institutions in the United States, thereby inciting federal lawmakers to
take their efforts a step further: the criminalization of the act of money laundering the
criminalization of the act of laundering money. The result was Subtitle H of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986, otherwise known as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986
(MLCA). 39 The MLCA made it illegal to actively engage in the laundering of money,40 to
willingly accept monies that are the fruits of criminal activity,4 1 or to structure transac-
37. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and the Regulations Implementing the Bank Secrecy
Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and
Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 1st Sess. 61,
75-76 (1987) (statement by Francis A. Keating, II, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement, U.S.
Department of the Treasury).
In the aftermath of Bank of Boston, it became apparent .. . that there had been
widespread intention to Bank Secrecy Act compliance by the financial community at
large and inadequate attention by the supervision agencies charged with examination
for Bank Secrecy Act compliance. As a result, countless financial institutions reassessed
their compliance program and audited their compliance history.
Id.
38. See, e.g., Michail Isikoff, Bank of Boston in Spotlight Unfolding Drama Has Shocked City's Financial
Community, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 3, 1985, at FO; Robert Garsson & Jay Rosenstein, Bank of
Boston Ignored Violation, Federal Agent Says; Legislation is Introduced in House to Crack Down on
Money Laundering, AMERICAN BANKER, Mar. 1, 1985, at 3; Lois Therrien et al., An All-Out Attack
on Banks That Launder Money, BUSINESS WEEK, Feb. 25, 1985, at 30; US. Enlarges Probe of Cash
Laundering CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 7, 1985, at 1; Major N.Y Banks Fined For Failure to Report
Transactions, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, June 18, 1985, at A13.
39. Money Laundering Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956-57, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324-26). In addition to the new crimes and forfeiture provi-
sions, the MLCA also amended Section 1961 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) to include violations of the money laundering statutes within the defi-
nition of "racketeering". See Lara W. Short et al., The Liability of Financial Institutions For Money
Laundering, 109 BANKING L. J. 46, 61-62 (1992). This greatly increases the liability of any party
engaged in money laundering. In addition to the criminal conviction for the money-laundering
offense, defendants now face separate RICO convictions if the money laundering is part of a pat-
tern of unlawful conduct. Furthermore, a private individual may now bring an action for treble
damages if a pattern of money-laundering activity is established. Finally, RICO provisions for
the seizure of assets are more extensive than those which otherwise apply. Id.
40. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1995).
41. See l8 U.S.C. § 1957(1995).
30 NAFTA law and Business Review of the Americas
tions for the purpose of evading reporting requirements. 42 In addition, the Act imposed
stiff new civil and criminal forfeiture laws on money launderers and the financial institu-
tions who assist them in plying their trade. 43
A. SECTION 1956 OF THE MLCA.
The core MLCA provision is 18 U.S.C. § 1956, which attacks those who actively
engage in money laundering from three different fronts. 44 First, section 1956(a)(1) takes
aim at money laundering activities involving financial transactions (much like section
5313 of the BSA's CTR and CTRC reporting requirements). 45 Second, section 1956(a)(2)
criminalizes the actual or attempted movement of monetary instruments into or out of
the United States in connection with unlawful activities (similar to the emphasis of section
5316 of the BSA). 46 Third, section 1956(a)(3) specifically addresses criminal sting opera-
tions directed at money laundering, making it a crime to attempt to promote unlawful
activity with, conceal the origin of, or avoid a transactional reporting requirement under
state or federal law involving monies held out by law enforcement officials to be criminally
derived.47
1. Section 1956(a)(1): The Crime of Using Financial
Transactions In Laundering Money.
A violation of section 1956(a)(1) may result in a fine amounting to the greater of
$500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the transaction and/or imprison-
ment for twenty years. 48 To establish a violation of subsection (a)(1), the government
must prove four elements: (i) the existence of funds derived from a specified unlawful
activity; (ii) knowledge of the origin of the funds; (iii) the use of a financial transaction;
and (iv) culpable intent 49
First, the government must demonstrate the involvement of "proceeds of [a] specified
unlawful activity".50 Such specified unlawful activities are defined in the statute through a
laundry list of over 100 different offenses. 5' Obviously, more than drug trafficking offens-
es are included, as the list also encompasses most crimes typically tied to organized crime
and financial mischief.5 2 To connect the proceeds to specified unlawful activity, the gov-
ernment must do more than merely show the defendant lacks a legitimate source of
42. See 3U.S.C. §5324 (1995).
43. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-982 (1995).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
45. See id at § 1956(a)(1) (1995); see31 U.S.C. § 5313.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1995); see 31 U.S.C. §5316.
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (1995).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (1995).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at§ 1956(c)(7) (1995).
52. Id. Examples include fraud, espionage, embezzlement, illegal arms sales, smuggling, bribery,
espionage, kidnapping, copyright infringement and environmental crimes.
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income.5 3 The government is not required to directly trace the proceeds to an unlawful
activity, however, and may create an inference that the funds were the fruits of illegality
through circumstantial evidence, as long as enough evidence exists to prove this fact
beyond a reasonable doubt.5 4 For example, in United States v. Massac, a money laundering
conviction was sustained when the government created an inference that the monies
involved were from a specified unlawful activity by presenting evidence that the defendant
was involved in drug trafficking and had made a wire transfer of cash to an offshore desti-
nation (Haiti). 55
Moreover, the monies involved in the financial transaction giving rise to the infraction
need not be derived exclusively from a specified unlawful activity. The commingling of
funds that are the product of illegality with those of a lawful source will not prevent the
government from succeeding on this element.5 6 As stated by the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Jackson, "we cannot believe that Congress intended that participants in unlawful
activities could prevent their own convictions under the money laundering statute simply
by commingling funds derived from both 'specified unlawful activities' and other activi-
ties."57
Second, the government must show under subsection (a)(1) that the defendant knew
the funds involved were derived from "some form of unlawful activity".58 The govern-
ment need not prove the defendant knew the exact crime that produced the funds or even
that the monies generated from a specific unlawful activity; the government need only
show the defendant knew "the funds [were] the proceeds of some kind of crime that is a
felony under Federal or State law."59 To make this showing, the government must demon-
strate the defendant had actual subjective knowledge of the illegal source of the funds.
However, persons cannot avoid being convicted under section 1956 by deliberately closing
their eyes -- by being willfully blind to the illegal source of the funds.
60
The concept of willful blindness is, to say the least, open to wide interpretation.
Courts and commentators, though unsuccessful in arriving at a generally applicable stan-
53. United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied, 1990 U.S. App.
LEXIS 14536 (1990). See also United States v. Torres, 53 E3d 1129, 1137 (10th Cir. 1995) (gov-
ernment agent's testimony that defendant had no legal source of income and that the money
underlying the wire transfers to him was not from any legal source of income was not by itself
sufficient to support a money laundering conviction under Section 1956, but that the agent's tes-
timony coupled with the testimony of another witness tying the defendant to drug trafficking
was sufficient to uphold the conviction.)
54. United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 497 (1992). "Although the government did not directly
prove that the money [the defendant] used. . . came from drug sales, it was reasonable for the
jury to infer this from the evidence." Id citing Blackman, 904 E2d at 1257.
55. United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 174 (3d Cir. 1989).
56. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991).
57. Id "[S]ection 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) allow for convictions were the funds involved in
the transaction are derived only in part from 'specified unlawful activities'" Id.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d 1193, 1201 (1st Cir. 1991). "This will eviscerate the defense that a
defendant knew the funds came from a crime, but thought the crime involved was a crime not on
the list of 'specified' crimes in section (c)(7)." Id.
60. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).
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dard, have provided some guidance. A mere suspicion will certainly not suffice.6 1 Willful
blindness has been defined as "where it can almost be said that the defendant actually
knew. He suspected the fact; he realized its probability; but he refrained from obtaining
the final confirmation because he wanted. . . to be able to deny knowledge."62 In inter-
preting the knowledge requirement for the purposes of section 1956(a), the Fourth Circuit
held in United States v. Campbell that the government must show "the defendant purposely
and deliberately contrived to avoid learning all the facts."63
The recent Fifth Circuit case of United States v. Giraldi offers some light to this issue.64
In Giraldi, the defendant claimed the prosecution failed to prove that he possessed the
requisite knowledge to be convicted under the MLCA. 65 At most, the defendant argued
the government had shown he should have known (a negligence standard) the money
involved in the transaction was tainted.66 The Fifth Circuit felt that even though it was a
"dose case," for a jury to conclude a private banker either knew or was willfully blind to
the fact that the source of his client's funds was illegal was reasonable.67 Factors swaying
the courts decision included: (i) the banker's failure to follow the bank's "know-your-
client" procedures when opening the account and later lying about this fact; (ii) the
banker's duty to investigate his clients and his failure to do so; (iii) false statements made
or ignored by the banker about the source of his client's funds in bank records; (iv) the
banker's failure to properly document transactions on the client's account; and (v) the
banker's attempts to control the damage once the federal authorities began to investigate
his client's holdings.68
The third element the government must prove under section 1956(a)(1) is that the
defendant conducted or attempted to conduct a financial transaction with the tainted
funds.69 As defined in section 1956(c)(4), a financial transaction is a transaction "involving
the movement of funds by wire or other means or involving one or more monetary instru-
ments, or involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehide, vessel, or aircraft, or a
transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree."70 "A [transaction]
indudes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery, or other disposition."7 1
61. 8 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITEDSTATES ATroRNEys' PROSECuTION MANUAL, 247 (1993).
62. Frans J. von Kaenel, Willful Blindness: A Permissible Substitute for Actual Knowledge Under the
Money Laundering Control Act?, 71 WASH U.L.Q. 1189, 1199 n.60 (1993) (citing GLANVELLE
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW. THE GENERAL PART 126 (2d ed. 1961).
63. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).




68. Id. at 1373. The defendant explained the condemning evidence against him as the product of
"memory lapses, misstatements, sloppiness, carelessness, [his] failure.., to be aware of the falsi-
ty of [the] statements, both oral and written, and. . . certain practices, such as vague purpose
statements on loan applications, [which] were 'standard procedure' in international banking."
Id. at 1374.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(4) (1995).
71. Id. at § 1956(c)(3).
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The broad definition of a financial transaction was crafted to encompass almost any
activity having the slightest relation to interstate commerce. 72 Acts such as merely writing
a check drawn on a financial institution involved in interstate commerce, giving a gift in
the form of a money order,73 and making use of the U.S. mail 74 have all been held to
involve a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce and, therefore, can subject a person to
the weight of the MLCA's penalties.
Nonetheless, the courts have refused to rubber stamp every activity as a financial
transaction for purposes of the statute. Obviously, the mere possession of the proceeds
from unlawful activity cannot be characterized as involving a financial transaction. 75 The
transportation of cash also falls outside the scope of the definition of a financial transac-
tion. 76 Defendants may be convicted under section 1956, however, if their actions are con-
sidered constituting a delivery of the funds, which is considered a financial transaction.77
Indeed, a fine line exists between the transportation and the delivery of funds, with courts
seemingly relying upon the defendant's control over the funds in making the distinction. 78
Finally, the government must prove the defendant acted with the requisite intent.
Specifically, the government must show the defendant intended to: (i) "promote the carry-
ing on of [a] specified unlawful activity";79 (ii) evade his or her tax liability under the laws
of the United States;80 (iii) cloak "the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or
the control of the proceeds of the specified unlawful activity";8' or (iv) avoid a reporting
requirement mandated by federal or state law.82
Courts have held an intent to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity may exist
even in situations when the actual unlawful act has been completed. In United States v.
Paramo, the Third Circuit held "a defendant can engage in financial transactions that pro-
mote not only ongoing or future unlawful activity, but also prior unlawful activity."83 In
Paramo, the defendant's cashing of embezzled checks was deemed to be performed with the
intent to promote the underlying unlawful activity because the defendant believed doing so
was necessary to realize the profits of his mail fraud scheme that had technically been com-
72. United States v. Jackson, 935 E2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
73. United States v. Koller, 956 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir. 1991).
74. United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1991).
75. United States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir. 1992). A defendant's "actual or construc-
tive possession of funds [illegally derived] does not allow the inference that [he] transferred,
delivered, moved, or otherwise disposed of the money as required by statute" IdL
76. See United States v. Reed, 77 F.3d 139, 143 (6th Cir. 1996).
77. Id.
78. Id. "[I)n this case, defendant is alleged to have arranged for the exchange of the proceeds, accept-
ed them into her possession, exercised control over the proceeds for a period of time, and autho-
rized the release of the proceeds to another individual. Under these facts, the defendant here
would clearly have effected a disposition of the proceeds." Id.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (1995).
80. Id. at § 1956(a)(1)(A)(ii).
81. Id.at § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
82. Id. at § 1956(a)(1)(B)(ii).
83. United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3rd Cir. 1993) (referencing United States v.
Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991)).
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pleted.84 The court opined a defendant need not have "funneled back" the proceeds into the
operation in order to possess an intent to promote the underlying criminal activity.8 5
In analyzing the intent to conceal the character of funds from an illegal source, the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Sanders reversed the conviction of a couple who had con-
spicuously purchased two automobiles with the proceeds of illegal drug transactions they
had conducted. 86 In emphasizing the apparent lack of effort to conceal or disguise the
purchase, the court stated that to apply the money laundering statutes to such "ordinary
commercial transactions" would "turn the money laundering statute into a 'money spend-
ing' statute," contradicting the intent of Congress.8 7
2. Section 1956(a)(2): The Crime of Transporting
Laundered Funds Across U.S. Borders.
Section 1956(a)(2) makes it a criminal offense for a person who transports, transmits,
or transfers a monetary instrument or funds (or attempts to do so) across U.S. borders:
a. intending to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity;
or
b. knowing the monetary instrument or funds involved
in the transportation represent the proceeds of some
form of unlawful activity and knowing such
transportation is designed in whole or in part:
(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of
specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement
under state or federal law, either with the intent to
promote a specified unlawful activity or with the
knowledge the funds were generated from a specified
unlawful activity and with the intent to conceal this
fact or to avoid a state or federal reporting
requirement. 88
84. Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1217. See also United States v. Marbella, 73 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1996)(lawyers convicted of laundering proceeds of fraudulent personal injury claims in which secret
referral fees to cappers were deemed to promote the underlying mail fraud activity by encourag-
ing the cappers to bring them future cases).
85. Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1217.
86. United States v. Sanders, 929 F.2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 116 L. Ed.2d 109, 112 S. Ct.
142 (1991). Note the intent to conceal or disguise the nature of the proceeds need not be present
in every party involved in the transaction. In United States v. Campbell 977 F.2d 854, 857 858
(4th Cir. 1992), the court upheld the conviction of a real estate agent who had sold a house to a
drug dealer despite the fact that her only motivation in the sale was to earn a commission. See
also United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 929 (D.C. 1995) (court finding intent to conceal when
only motivation of clothing store owner in selling to drug dealers was to realize a profit).
87. Sanders, 929 E2d at 1471-72. See also United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469 (10th Cir.
1994) (defendant used drug money to pay his mortgage and to make personal expenditures such
as the purchase of a watch, a horse, and a trailer).
88. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2) (1995).
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The penalties for a violation of section 1956(a)(2) are similar to those provided in sec-
tion 1956(a)(1). 8 9 Under section 1956(a)(2)(A), the government must only demonstrate
the defendant transported, transmitted, or transferred funds across U.S. borders with the
intention of promoting a specified unlawful activity.90 Unlike in section 1956(a)(1), the
government does not have to show the funds derived from such an activity or the defen-
dant knew of the monies' criminal origins. 91 These elements do have to be proven, how-
ever if the government is to succeed under section 1956(a)(2)(B). Additionally, the gov-
ernment must show the defendant possessed an intent to either disguise the character of
the funds or to avoid a reporting requirement to succeed under section 1956(a)(1)(B). 92
3. Section 1956(a) (3): Crime as a Product of Money
Laundering Sting Operations.
Section 1956(a)(3) makes it unlawful for a person to conduct or to make an attempt
to conduct a financial transaction involving property represented by law enforcement
agents to be either the product of a specified unlawful activity or used to conduct or facili-
tate such an activity.93 In addition to proving the actual act or attempt as described above,
the government must also demonstrate that the defendant possessed the intent to: (i) pro-
mote a specified unlawful activity; (ii) cloak the character of the property believed to be
from a specified unlawful activity; or (iii) avoid reporting the transaction under state or
federal law.94 If found guilty of violating Section 1956(a)(3), a person "shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than 20 years, or both."95
B. SECTION 1957 OF THE MLCA.
Section 1957 criminalizes the knowing acceptance of tainted funds. Under this sec-
tion, a person can be fined or imprisoned for up to ten years for participating in a mone-
tary transaction involving property derived from a specified unlawful activity and of a
value greater than US $10,000.96 The government must prove the defendant knew the
property was criminally derived, but it need not demonstrate the defendant had knowl-
edge the crime involved was a specified unlawful activity.97 A section 1957 violation is
89. Id.; see also id. at § 1956(a)(1).
90. Id. at § 1956(a)(2)(A). Courts have broadly interpreted "transport, transmit, or transfer" in sub-
section (a)(2) to include activities from wire transfers, United States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285,
1296 (5th Cir. 1992), to actual smuggling of cash across the U.S. border, United States v. Ortiz,
738 F.Supp 1394 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
91. Id.
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B) & (a)(1)(B) (1995); see supra, notes 60 through 68 on proving the funds
were derived from a specified unlawful activity and the requisite knowledge of the defendant.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3). Section 1956(a)(3) defines "represented" as "any representation made by
a law enforcement officer or by another person at the direction of, or with the approval of, a
Federal official authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of this section." Id&
94. Id. Note also that, as with subsection (a)(2), the intent to avoid U.S. tax laws is not an actionable
violation of subsection (a)(3). Id. at § 1956(a)(3).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3) (1995).
96. Id. at § 1957.
97. Id. at § 1957(c).
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generally easier for the government to prove because such violation does not require the
defendant knew of an intent to conceal the nature of the transaction, or even that anyone
had such an intent.98 In short, section 1957 does not require the defendant had an intent
to promote money laundering activities; that the defendant accepted the money knowing
it represented ill-gotten gains is enough.99
C. THE MLCA ANTI-STRUCTURING PROVISIONS.
Money launderers in the 1970s and early 1980s were able to avoid making the
required BSA filings and to escape regulatory scrutiny by unbundling financial transac-
tions into dollar amounts below $10,000. The practice of structuring financial transac-
tions in amounts below the $10,000 floor of the BSA reporting requirements is commonly
referred to as structuring, or smurfing.1°° Attempts by the government to prosecute those
engaging in structuring were met with disparate results. While some federal courts
allowed the multiple transactions to be aggregated for the purposes of meeting the $10,000
threshold, 101 others held the BSA did not contain the duty to report such structured trans-
actions and that to impose such a requirement would be violative of the notice require-
ment of the Due Process Clause.102 Congress eventually decided to address this judicial
split in the MLCA by enacting the anti-structuring provisions of sections 5322 and 5324 of
Title 31 of the U.S. Code. 10 3
Section 5324 criminalizes the act of structuring, making it illegal to cause or to
attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to: (i) fail to file a CTR; (ii) file a CTR
with material misstatements or omissions; or (iii) perform or assist in the performance of
structuring a transaction designed to avoid CMIR filing requirements. 104 Section 5322
sets the penalties for a section 5324 violation. As originally drafted, the repercussions of
98. See United States v. Wynn, 61 F.3d 921, 926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1995). "Due to the omission of a
'design to conceal' element, section 1957 prohibits a wider range of activity than money 'launder-
ing,' as traditionally understood." Id.
99. For a discussion of section 1957 and its Constitutional implications see Paul G. Wolfteich, Making
Criminal Defense a Crime Under 18 U.S.C. Section 1957,41 VAND. L. REv. 843 (1988).
100. John J. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting Requirements Really Assist the Government?, 44
ALA. L. REv. 801,808-809 (1993).
101. See, e.g., United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (8th Cir. 1983).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Varbel, 780 E2d 758 (9th Cir. 1986).
103. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 & 5324 (1995). See The Drug Money Seizure Act and the Bank Secrecy Act
Amendments: Hearing on S.571 and S.2306 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (Francis A. Keating, I, Assistant Secretary for Enforcement,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, stated that the proposed anti-structuring law promised to clarify the
law by resolving discrepancies among three different federal circuits in the application of the
BSA).
104. 31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1995). The language of section 5316 already contains an anti-structuring rule.
The section makes it unlawful for a person to transport more than U.S. $10,000 across the U.S.
borders at one time. Id. § 5316. The regulations have defined at one time to mean in one calen-
dar day or over the period of two or more days where the intent is to avoid the reporting require-
ments. 31 C.F.R. § 103.11(a)(1)-(6)(ii) (1992).
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section 5322(a) hinged on finding the defendant willfully violated section 5324.105
Judicial uncertainty as to the correct reading of the provisions developed, as the federal
courts were split on the correct interpretation of willfulness in relation to the statute. In
1994 the U.S. Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, seemingly resolved the issue in
Ratzlaf v. United States, by holding that in order to sustain a conviction under the anti-
structuring provisions of the BSA, the government must demonstrate the defendant not
only structured financial transactions to avoid invoking the reporting requirements, but
also did so knowing his conduct was unlawful. 106
In Ratzlaf, the defendant was a regular gambler who lost $160,000 at the blackjack
tables at a Reno, Nevada casino in 1988. At the end of the week the casino gave Mr. Ratzlaf
to pay off his debt, he and his wife returned with a $100,000 partial payment in cash.
When Mr. Ratzlaf requested the casino not fill out any written report on the transaction,
the casino's management refused to accept the payment with this condition and informed
Mr. Ratzlaf of the casino's CTRC filing requirement. The management suggested the casi-
no could accept a single cashier's check for the full amount without triggering the report-
ing requirements, however, and provided Mr. Ratzlaf a limousine and a driver to go to a
bank for this purpose. Upon learning banks had similar $10,000 transaction reporting
requirements, Mr. Ratzlaf decided to purchase a series of cashier's checks from different
banks, all below the $10,000 reporting threshold. Thereafter, Mr. Ratzlaf delivered the
checks to the casino. Over the following weeks, Mr. Ratzlaf purchased or arranged for the
purchase through others of several more such cashier's checks, with which he finally paid
the balance of the debt he owed to the casino. Ultimately, Mr. Ratzlaf was indicted and
convicted of structuring transactions in violation of section 5324.
After the Ninth Circuit upheld his conviction, Mr. Ratzlaf applied for and was granted
certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court. In oral arguments, counsel for Mr. Ratzlaf
focused his argument around the meaning of willfully as found in section 5322, asserting
that in order to convict a person under the anti-structuring laws, the government must
prove the defendant knew what he was doing was a prohibited activity.107 In response, the
government asserted ignorance of the law is never an excuse and the inclusion of the anti
structuring provisions within the BSA was intended to prevent the use of such a
defense. 108 The U.S. Supreme Court, through the pen of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dis-
agreed with the government's argument and sided with Mr. Ratzlaf. In so doing, the Court
held that to establish a defendant willfully violated the antistructuring law, the government
must prove the defendant acted with the knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.109
105. 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a). The original section 5322 read: "A person willfully violating this subchapter
or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter (except section 5315 or 5324 of this title or a
regulation prescribed under section 5315 or 5324) shall be fined not more than $250,000, or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both." IdM (emphasis added).
106. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
107. Victor Williams, The Willful Standard in Bank Criminal Statute:: Ratzlaf Revisited, 112 BANKING
L.J. 660,670-671 (1995) (referencing 62 USLW 3365-3367 (Nov. 30, 1993)).
108. Id.
109. Ratzaf, 510 U.S. at 138. For a general discussion on the Ratzlaf decision, see Rachael Simonoff,
Ratzlaf v. United States: The Meaning of "Willful" and the Demands of Due Process, 28 COLUM J. L.
& SOC. PROBS. 397 (1995).
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Justice Ginsburg's opinion did not, however, stand the test of time. In fact, in an
uncharacteristically quick response, Congress repealed Ratzlaf in a provision included in
the Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (MLSA). 1"0 As amended, section 5324
establishes that whoever violates its edict will be subject to criminal penalties, thereby cir-
cumventing the willfulness requirement set out in section 5322.111 Congress struck the
word willful from section 5322 and legislatively circumvented the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Ratzlaf As a result, the government need only prove the defendant knowingly
acted with the intent to evade the BSA's reporting requirements in order to sustain a suc-
cessful conviction under the anti-structuring provisions of sections 5322 and 5324.
D. THE MLCA FORFEITURE PROVISIONS.
In addition to criminalizing money laundering activities, the MLCA also gives law
enforcement officials the powerful weapon of forfeiture to mount an aggressive assault on
the revenues of drug traffickers. 112 These MLCA provisions allow for civil and criminal
forfeitures, respectively.113
Section 981 enables the government to seek the forfeiture of property involved in or
produced from transgressions of the MLCA's money laundering crimes (18 U.S.C. §§
1596-1597), of the MLCA's anti-structuring provision (31 U.S.C. § 5324), or of the CTR
transactional filing requirements (31 U.S.C. § 5313(a)). 1 4 In addition, section 981 pro-
vides for the forfeiture of any property located in the United States representing proceeds
of illegal drug activities in a foreign country either punishable in that State by more than a
year in jail or so punishable if committed in the United States. 115
The civil forfeiture provisions of section 981 allow the government to seize tainted
property subject to lawful searches or arrests and to attain warrants for such seizures. 116
Once the property has been seized, the government can seek to have it forfeited in a forfei-
ture suit instituted against the property itself (an in rem action). 117 To succeed, the gov-
ernment must demonstrate a substantial connection between the underlying crime and
110. Id.
111. See Money Laundering Suppression Act Pub.L. No. 103-325 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5313
(1995). Note also that section 5321(a)(4)(A), providing the possibility for civil penalty ramifica-
tions for structuring transactions in violation of section 5324, was amended to remove the will-
fulness requirement. See Kathryn Keneally, Congress Loosens Supreme Court's Interpretation of
'Specific Intent', 82 J. TAX'N 110 (1995).
112. See Federal Government's Response to Money Laundering: Hearings Before the Committee on
Banking, Finance, & Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 200-01 (1993).
113. 18 U.S.C. § 981,982 (1995).
114. Id.
115. Id. at § 981(a)(l)(B).
116. Id. at § 981(b)(1) & (2).
117. Section 981's venue provision states such a lawsuit can be brought "in the judicial district in
which the defendant owning such property is found or in the judicial district in which the crimi-
nal prosecution is brought." Id. at § 981(h).
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the property sought to be forfeited. 118 This connection does not necessarily imply, howev-
er, that the suspect property must be directly traced to a specific offense; rather, the gov-
ernment need only establish an inference that the property represents the product of such
an offense. 119 However, the statute does contain measures to protect innocent owners,
who had no knowledge of the laundering activity, from having their property forfeited.
Persons able to successfully shoulder the burden of establishing they were not involved in
the underlying criminal activity can escape forfeiture. 120 Once property is deemed to have
been forfeited, section 981 provides for the division of the spoils among state and federal
law enforcement agencies of the United States 121 and similar agencies from participating
foreign countries. 122
The criminal forfeiture provision of section 982 directs upon a conviction of a MLCA
money laundering offense the forfeiture of any property representing or traceable to the
gross receipts obtained through the commission of the offense. 123 The burden shouldered
by the government in such forfeiture actions is predicated on a mere preponderance of the
evidence standard. 124 In addition, the government may obtain a warrant, based on proba-
ble cause, to seize property prior to the trial of the defendant on money laundering
charges. 125 In such cases, courts may enter preliminary orders of forfeiture allowing the
government to assert a claim to the property.126
118. The substantial connection test seems to represent the majority view among the Federal Circuit
Courts. The First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits explicitly require the property to be forfeited
to have a substantial connection to the illegal activity. See, e.g., United States v. 5709 Hillingon
Road, Charlotte, N.C., 919 F. Supp. 863 (W.D.N.C. 1996); United States v. One Parcel Property
Located at 427 and 429 Hall Street, Montgomery, Montgomery County, Alabama, 842 ESupp.
1421 (M.D. Ala., N.D. 1994) (providing a summary of the differing views among the Federal
Circuit Courts); U.S. v. One 1988 Prevost Liberty Motor Home, 952 F. Supp. 1180 (S.D.Tex 1996).
However, the substantial connection test has been rejected in other cirucuits, namely the Second
and Seventh, in favor of a lesser standard. For instance, the Second Circuit merely requires the
government to show a nexus between the illegal activity and the property to be forfeited. See,
e.g., United States v. One 1990 Mercedes Benz, 1996 WL 252659 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
119. See e.g., United States v. Puello, 814 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1995). "No property shall be forfeited under this section to the extent of
the interest of an owner or lienholder by reason of any act or omission established by that owner
or lienholder to have been committed without the knowledge of that owner or lienholder." Id.
For cases involving the innocent owner defense, see United States v. All Assets of G.P.S.
Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. 1980 Lear Jet, Model 35A, Serial
Number 277, 25 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing similar concept of innocent lienholder);
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, V.I.N. SRH-16266, 43 F.3d 794 (3rd Cir. 1994) (applying
innocent owner defense to 21 U.S.C. § 881 that prescribes the forfeiture of proceeds of illegal
narcotics transactions).
121. 18 U.S.C.§ 981(e) (1995).
122. Id. at §981(i)(1).
123. Id. at § 982(a).
124. See e.g., United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1082 (3rd Cir. 1996); United States v. Myers, 21 F.3d
826,829 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1995).
125. 21 U.S.C. § 853(0 (1995).
126. Id. at § 853(g). Upon such an order, the government must give public notice so that any person
with a legal claim to the property can be allowed to come forward to contest the forfeiture. Id. at
§ 853(n).
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III. 1988 Amendments to the BSA.
In 1988 Congress added two new provisions to the BSA: 31 U.S.C. §§ 5325 & 5326.127
These two sections differ in their approach toward money laundering activities, yet both
similarly broaden the U.S. Treasury's authority and impose additional requirements upon
financial institutions. 128
A. THE $3000 RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENT.
Section 5325 imposes new verification and recordkeeping requirements on financial
institutions selling bank checks, cashier's checks, traveler's checks, or money orders in
amounts exceeding US $3,000.129 As implemented by Treasury regulation, financial insti-
tutions cannot sell such instruments in amounts of $3,000 to $10,000 unless they properly
verify the purchaser and record certain facts about the transaction.130
The requirements differ between purchasers who are account holders and those who
are not. For account-holding purchasers, the financial institution can first verify the pur-
chaser's identity by a signature card or other file or record it has maintained on the
account holder, or, if such identification is not possible, the financial institution can make
use of another type of document commonly used for identification for the purpose of
"cashing checks for nondepositors and which contains the name and address of the pur-
chaser." 13 1 For purchasers not holding an account with the institution, the solution to ver-
ification is, quite obviously, to make use of the latter alternative, requiring the purchaser to
provide, for example, a driver's license. 132
After proper verification of the purchaser is obtained by the financial institution, cer-
tain facts about the transaction must be recorded and maintained by the financial institu-
tion. For purchases by account holders, a record must be made of the purchaser's name,
the date of the transaction, and the types, serial numbers, and amounts of the respective
instruments purchased. 133 For purchases made by nonaccount holders, in addition to the
information required on account holders the financial institution must also include in the
record the address and social security or alien identification number of the purchaser. 134
Records on both types of purchasers must be kept by the financial institution for a period
of five years, and they must be made available to the Treasury upon request.' 35
As a final note on the $3,000 recordkeeping requirement, an anti structuring provi-
sion is contained within 31 C.F.R § 103.29 similar to the provision found in 31 U.S.C. §
5316. In subsection 103.29(b), the regulation provides contemporaneous purchases and
127. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5325 & 5326 (1995).
128. Id
129. Id at § 5325(a). The floor for section 5325 was set at $3000 because structured transactions were
often performed in $3000 increments. John J. Byrne, The Bank Secrecy Act: Do Reporting
Requirements Really Assist the Government?, 44 ALA. L. REv. 801 n.36 (1993) (referencing CLIFF E.
COOK, BANK SEcREcY 56 (1991).
130. See 31 C.FR. § 103.29 (1995).
131. Id. at § 103.29(a)(1).
132. Id. at § 103.29(a)(2).
133. Id. at § 103.29(a)(1)(i)(A)-(E).
134. Id. at § 103.29(a)(2)(i)(A)-(G).
135. Id at § 103.29(c).
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multiple purchases over the period of a single day are to be treated as one purchase for
purposes of the recording requirement. 136
B. GEOGRAPHICAL TARGETING ORDERS.
Section 5326 authorizes the Treasury to target specific financial institutions or groups
of financial institutions in a certain locality and to require them to maintain additional
records and to submit additional reportings. 137 To utilize section 5326, the Treasury must
only demonstrate "reasonable grounds exist for concluding that additional recordkeeping
and reporting requirements are necessary to carry out the purposes of [the money laun-
dering laws and regulations] and prevent" persons from evading the reporting/recordkeep-
ing requirements. 138 The Secretary of the Treasury is given broad discretion to structure
these orders, which may: (i) be issued to "any domestic financial institution or group of
domestic financial institutions in a geographic area"; (ii) target any such "monetary instru-
ments as the Secretary may describe"; and (iii) set the threshold amount for purposes of
making reports and maintaining records at any level consistent with the finding. 139 The
Treasury must limit the duration of an additional reporting requirement issued under sec-
tion 5326 to sixty days, however, unless a renewal of the order is granted. 140 Finally, a later
statutory enactment inserted a strict confidentiality provision into section 5326, prevent-
ing the financial institution from disclosing the terms or even the existence of a targeting
order. 141
IV. The Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992.
Partially as a legislative response to the Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) debacle, 142 Congress again amended the BSA by enacting the Annunzio-Wylie
Anti-Money Laundering Act (Annunzio-Wylie Act) as part of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1992.143 The Annunzio-Wylie Act could be seen as sig-
136. Id. at § 103.29(b).
137. 31 U.S.C. § 5326 (1995).
138. Id. at § 5326(a); see also 31 C.F.R. § 103.26(a).
139. Steven C. Tabackman, Tips on What To Do About Those Geographical Targeting Orders, 7 NO. 2
MONEY LAUNDERING L. REP. 1, 6 (1996). Section 103.26(c) of the Federal Regulations implement-
ing section 5326 of the BSA requires seven different items be included within a GTO, such as: (i)
the dollar amount of the suspect transactions; (ii) the types of the transactions concerned; (iii)
the form to be used for reporting the transactions; (iv) the address to which the reports must be
sent; (v) the beginning and ending dates for the reports; (vi) a contact person within the
Treasury; and (vii) the period for which the financial institution is required to maintain the par-
ticular records. Id.
140. 31 C.ER. § 103.26(d)(1) (1995).
141. 31 U.S.C. § 5326(c) (1995). See Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act Pub. L. No. 102-55
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1995)) (1992).
142. Amy G. Rudnick and James M. Schwartz, Banks Must Gear Up for Comprehensive New Money
Laundering Law, BANKING POL'Y REp., Dec. 21, 1992, at 2. A principal motivation behind the
enactment of the Annunzio-Wylie Act was the federal government's frustration in not being able
to shut down the offices of the BCCI even after it had been convicted of money laundering. Id.
143. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act §5312.
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nifying a shift in U.S. money laundering policy, as the focus of regulation began to swing
more toward the financial institutions themselves and away from central bureaucratic
supervision. The changes the Act introduced can be categorized into three separate, albeit
inter-related, areas: (i) a significant increase in the penalties attached with violations of the
money laundering laws; (ii) a broadening of the scope of the BSA; and (iii) an endowment
of regulatory responsibility under the BSA to the financial institutions.
The first category of changes brought about by the Annunzio-Wylie Act increased the
government's ability to punish money launderers, effectively raising the stakes associated
with this type of activity. First, the Act created the death penalty for violations of the
MLCA money laundering crimes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957) and of criminal (willful) viola-
tions of the BSA (31 U.S.C. § 5322). 144 If convicted of violating MLCA sections 1956 or
1957, the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is required to institute termination pro-
ceedings. 145 If the financial institution is convicted of criminally violating the BSA, the
OCC has the option of instituting termination proceedings. 146 The factors influencing the
OCC termination decisions indude the knowledge or involvement by directors or senior
executives in the violation, the prevention policies implemented by the institution before
the violation and after the conviction, the cooperation of the institution with law enforce-
ment officials, and the negative effect the termination of the institution would have on the
local community. 147 Along similar lines, the Annunzio-Wylie Act makes it possible for
individual bank officials to be banned from the industry if they are convicted of money
laundering. 148
As a complement to the death penalty termination provisions, the Annunzio-Wylie
Act also increased the civil liability for BSA violations. Section 1561 of the Act introduced
a negligence standard into the formula for determining civil liability under 31 U.S.C. §
5321.149 Section 5321 of the BSA now provides a financial institution may be fined up to
$500 for negligent violations of the BSA. 150 If the Treasury establishes a pattern of negli-
gent activity regarding the BSA, the financial institution may be fined up to $50,000.151
The final provision in the punishment category relates not to the government's ability
to prosecute and to punish, but to the latitude the government may enjoy in seeking to
have assets involved in and produced by BSA violations forfeited. The Annunzio-Wylie
Act made it unnecessary for the U.S. government to identify the specific property involved
in the offense for the purposes of forfeiture,15 2 and further did away with the defense that
"the property involved in. . . an offense ha[d] been removed and replaced by identical
144. See id. at §§ 1502-1503. The Act makes the death penalty provisions applicable not only to
banks, but also to other institutions such as federal savings associations, credit unions, and state
depository institutions. Md.
145. See id. at § 1502(a)(1)(A)(ii) (relating to the violation of a national bank of the MLCA).
146. See id. at § 1502(a)(1)(B) (relating to the criminal violation of a national bank of the BSA).
147. See id. at § 1502(a)(2)(A)-(E) (relating to termination proceedings instituted against a national
bank).




152. Id. at §1522 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 984 (1992)).
Summer 1997 43
property."153 The new 18 U.S.C. § 984 civil forfeiture of fungible property provision can
be used by the government in connection with any offense of sections 1956, 1957, or 1960
(prohibiting illegal money transmitting businesses, as well as violations of the MLCA's
anti-structuring provisions housed at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322 and 5324.154 Section 984's reach
has even been expanded to catch funds in interbank accounts, though in order for the gov-
ernment to effect forfeiture of these monies it must show the financial institution know-
ingly engaged in the offense. 155
The second category of changes in U.S. money laundering law brought about by the
Annunzio-Wylie Act relate to an expansion of the law's scope. First, the Annunzio-Wylie
Act enlarged the definition of financial transaction to indude the "transfer of title to any
real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft" 156
Second, section 1956's coverage was amended to include additional domestic and for-
eign crimes within the MLCA's definition of specified unlawful activity.157 The domestic
crimes added to the laundry list indude food stamp fraud in violation of the Food Stamp Act
of 1977 exceeding $5,000, and any felony violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.158
The foreign crimes are included in the definition of specified unlawful activity are kidnap-
ping, robbery, extortion against a foreign state, or fraud on a foreign bank. 159 As a result,
individuals or entities either using in a financial transaction or transporting across the bor-
ders of the United States the proceeds of these foreign crimes are now subject to the criminal
and civil penalties, as well as the forfeiture provisions, established by the MLCA. 160
Third, the Annunzio-Wylie Act expanded the breadth of the MLCA's anti structuring
provisions to include international monetary instrument transactions. For a person to fail to
file or to file with a material misstatement or omission, or to cause another to do so, a CMIR
report required by 31 U.S.C. § 5316, or to structure the importation or exportation of mone-
tary instruments to come below the $10,000 reporting requirement, is now a crime.161
Fourth, the operation of an illegal money transmitting business was criminalized. 162
By adding section 1960 to Title 18 of the U.S. Code, the Annunzio-Wylie Act established a
maximum penalty of a five-year prison sentence and/or a $250,000 fine for whoever
knowingly "conducts, controls, manages, supervises, directs, or owns" a money transmit-
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; United States v. $814,254.76, 51 E3d 207 (9th Cir. 1995). One of the first reported cases
under section 984, United States v. $814,254.76 shows the vulnerability of interbank accounts to
this new fungible property forfeiture provision if the government can demonstrate an employee
of the bank knew the particular account had been used to launder money. Gordon Greenberg &
Thomas M. Brown, Banks Beware: §984 Increases Money Laundering Liability, 5 NO. 10 MONEY
LAUNDERING L. REP. 1 (1995).
156. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act § 1527157. Id. at § 1536.
158. Id. at §1534.
159. Id.
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1995).
161. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act § 1525.
162. 18 U.S.C. § 1960 was intended to establish a balance between federal and state regulation of the
non-bank financial institution industry. U.S. Indicts Under 'Illegal Money Transmitter' Law,
MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, May 1996, at 2, 3.
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ting business without the appropriate state license when such operation constitutes a
felony or a misdemeanor under the law of that state. 163 As defined by section 1960, money
transmitting includes "transferring funds on behalf of the public by any and all means
including but not limited to transfers within this country or to locations abroad by wire,
check, draft, facsimile or courier."164
The final provision in the second category addresses wire transfers. The Annunzio-
Wylie Act directs the Secretary of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board to jointly
draft regulations governing the recordkeeping of wire transfers. 165 The crux of the regula-
tions, as set out in the amendment, is the establishment of recordkeeping requirements for
both domestic wire transfers (to which insured banks will be subject) and international
wire transfers (to which insured banks and nonbank financial institutions will be
subject). 166 Banks accepting payment orders for wire transfers must maintain either the
original or a copy of the payment order or information relating to such payment order,
depending upon their role in the transaction. 167 The regulation does contain certain
exemptions, however, allowing transmittals involving such entities as the United States,
state governments, banks, and securities brokers or dealers to escape the recordkeeping
requirements. 168
The third category of changes brought about by the Annunzio-Wylie Act involved an
endowment of regulatory responsibility under the BSA to the financial institutions. One
can most dearly view the shift in regulatory approach from a central bureaucracy toward
the financial institutions themselves in this category.
The Annunzio-Wylie Act added section 5327 to the BSA, requiring depository institu-
tions to identify their customers and financial institutions with which they do business,
even if the latter do not hold accounts with the bank, and to file reports on and about such
parties to and upon direction by the Treasury. 169 In addition, the Treasury was authorized
to require all financial institutions (not just depository institutions) to report cash transac-
tions in excess of $10,000 on an I.R.S. Form 8300.170 The Act also broadened the accessi-
bility of the BSA reports filed by financial institutions. Section 5319 now allows the
Treasury to make information included in BSA reports filed under sections 5313, 5314,
and 5316 available to state financial supervisory agencies. 171
Perhaps the most significant area of expansion by the Annunzio-Wylie Act was the
authorization it extended to the Treasury to require financial institutions to file Suspicious
163. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act § 1512
164. Id.
165. Id. at §1515.
166. Id.
167. 31 CFR § 103.33(e)(1996).
168. Id. at § 103.33(e)(6).
169. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act § 1511.
170. 26 U.S.C. § 6501 (1988). See Duncan E. Alford, Anti-Money Laundering Regulaions: A Burden on
Financial Institutions, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 437,461 (1994).
171. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act §1506.
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Activity Reports (SARs)1 72 and to develop internal anti-money laundering programs.173
The Act authorizes the Treasury to require financial institutions to file SARs when they
believe such filings would be "relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation." 17
4
Supplanting the Criminal Referral Form, the SAR is intended to be easier to fill out and
quicker to file. 175 As implemented by Treasury Regulation, the Final Rule on the SAR
Reporting Requirements became effective on April 1, 1996. 176
A financial institution is required to report suspicious transactions involving more
than $5,000 if it can identify the suspect, but the institution must only file an SAR in situa-
tions in which discerning the party to whom the suspicious activity is attributable is diffi-
cult when the amount in question exceeds $25,000.177 A transaction is to be reported
(considered suspicious) if the financial institution "knows, suspects, or has reason to sus-
pect" it: (i) involves or is an attempt to disguise proceeds from illegal activity; (ii) is
designed to evade the requirements of the BSA; or (iii) appears to have no business or
apparent lawful purpose. 178 The Treasury has conceded banks are required to apply their
judgment to the relevant facts and circumstances to determine whether a SAR needs to be
filed; the Treasury has, however, indicated some fact patterns will clearly give rise to the
need to file. 179 The contents of the SAR include information on the reporting financial
institution, the suspicious activity and actor(s), witnesses to the event, and the person who
prepared the SAm. 180 Lastly, the financial institution has thirty days from the initial detec-
tion of the facts giving cause to file a SAR within which to make such a filing, but an addi-
172. Id. at § 1517. In an August 1996 Advisory, FinCEN provided a brief sketch of the focus of the
SARs and, indeed, the readjusted focus of the U.S. money laundering laws in general:
The Congress and the Treasury have carefully crafted anti-money laundering laws and
regulations to focus on the reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institu-
tions. That focus recognizes that it is representatives of financial institutions, rather
than law enforcement, who see the money launderers first; illicit proceeds are almost
always moved through some form of financial institution. The focus also recognizes
that the commercial precautions and expertise financial institutions use to protect
themselves from fraud, theft, and misuse, equips those institutions to recognize what is
or is not suspicious.
Court Interprets 'Safe Harbor' Provision, FINCEN ADVISORY (FINCEN, VIENNA, VA), Aug. 1996.
173. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act §1517.
174. 31 U.S.C. § 5314(g).
175. See Suspicious Activity Report, 6 BANKERS' HOTuNE 1 (1995) (stating that the estimated time for
completing the SAR will be only forty minutes). See 31 C.F.R. § 103.20 et seq. (providing instruc-
tions for the completion of the SAR).
176. 31 C.F.R.§ 103 (1996).
177. Matthew R. Hall, An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct- Banks, Money Laundering and
the Suspicious Activity Report, 84 KY. L.J. 643, 656 (1995-1996) (citing Suspicious Activity Report,
6 Banker's Hotline 1 (1995)).
178. 31 C.F.R.§ 103.21(a)(2) (1995).
179. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations: Requirement To Report Suspicious
Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 4326,4329 (1996). Examples of fact patterns clearly giving rise to the
need to file a SAR would be when there has been a series of withdrawals or payments made
below the $10,000 threshold or a refusal to provide the bank with information necessary for its
recordkeeping/reporting requirements. Id.
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tional thirty days is provided if no suspect can be readily identified. 18 1 In addition, banks
must make a phone call to the appropriate law enforcement officials without delay if the
violation requires immediate attention.18 2
The actual filing of SARs is a rather simple process and was intended to serve as an
improvement on its predessor, the Criminal Referral Form. The SAR form is relatively
quick to complete and need only be filed with a single institution -- the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN).18 3 In addition, no supporting documentation need be
sent with the SAR, though the bank is required to keep such documents and a copy of the
SAR on file for a period of five years.184
Coupled with the SAR filing provisions are both an admonishment prohibiting the fil-
ing institutions from notifying the customers on whom they have filed SARs185 and an
incentive for financial institutions to make such filings by means of a safe harbor provision
immunizing them from liability that could stem from the SARs.186 The safe harbor serves
as a haven from liability not only for the financial institutions, but also extends to direc-
tors, officers, employees and agents.187 As an added incentive, the Act provides whistle-
blower protections for employees notifying the authorities about violations of the BSA. 188
This provision provides a whistleblower subsequently discharged by a financial institution
180. Hall, supra note 177
181. 31 C.F.R. § 103.21(b)(3) (1995).
182. Warren L. Dennis & Jeremy R. Feinberg, The Evolving Standard of Care in Bank Officer and
Director Liability Cases, 935 PRACTISING L. INST. CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 741,
775 (1996). A situation would be deemed as requiring immediate attention, for example, if the
reportable violation is ongoing. I&
183. Before, banks were required to file multiple copies of the Criminal Referral Form with their
respective federal regulators and law enforcement agencies and were supposed to indicate on the
CTR forms whether a particular transaction was suspicious. U.S. Dep't. of Treasury, Simplified
Reporting System Benefits Bankers and Law Enforcement (Feb. 5, 1996)
<http://www.ustreas.gov/treasury/bureaus/fincen/020496.html>.
184. Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations: Requirement to Report Suspicious
Transactions, 61 Fed. Reg. 43'26 (1996). FinCEN has gauged the completion time of a SAR at a
single hour. Id. at 4331. As it expects to receive around 15,000 of these forms annually, this
translates into 15,000 work hours per year spent filling out these forms. Id.
185. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act § 1517(b).
186. Id. at § 1517(b) (1992). In a recent case, a U.S. District Court supported the sanctity of section
5318's safe harbor. Merrill Lynch v. Green, 936 F. Supp. 942 (S.D. Fla. 1996). On June 14, 1996,
the court made permanent a preliminary injunction staying arbitration proceedings sought by
the customer to resolve his claim for damages claimed as a result of the SAR filed by Merrill
Lynch without his knowledge. See Court Interprets 'Safe Harbor' Provision, FINCEN ADvISORY
(FINCEN, VIENNA, VA), Aug. 1996. See also U.S. Steps in to Uphold 'Safe Harbor' Shield for Firm
that Filed SAR, MONEY LAUNDERING ALERT, May 1996, at 3 (containing statement from Miami
U.S. Attorney's office in support of Merrill Lynch's stance on the safe harbor provision).
187. Dennis & Feinberg, supra note 182, at 775.
188. Annunzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act § 1563.
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with a battery of remedies, including reinstatement and compensatory damages.18 9
As a final matter, the Annunzio-Wylie Act may require financial institutions to estab-
lish internal anti-money laundering programs. 190 At a minimum, these programs must:
(i) facilitate the development of internal policies, procedures, and controls; (ii) designate a
compliance officer; (iii) institute an ongoing employee training program; and (iv) incor-
porate an independent audit function to test programs. 191
An extension of these internal programs are the know-your-customer (KYC) pro-
grams. The Treasury, via the FinCEN, has been expected to issue regulations establishing
mandatory KYC programs for quite some time. Until such regulations are forthcoming,
banks are being encouraged to establish adequate KYC programs on their own. As stated
by the OCC, "KYC policies increase the likelihood that the bank will be in compliance with
all statutes and regulations relating to the BSA and that it is adhering to safe and sound
banking practices" 192 An effective KYC program should be expected to compel bank per-
sonnel to: (i) take reasonable care to ascertain the identity of all customers; (ii) be able to
identify the true owners of accounts; (iii) obtain adequate indentification information on
all new customers; (iv) acquire evidence of identity on all persons seeking to conduct sig-
nificant business transactions, such as wire transfers; and (v) note any unusual deviations
from a customer's normal banking activities.193 Establishing such a program is in the best
interest of the bank, as the program will merely formalize a necessary procedure under the
other requirements of the BSA, e.g., the suspicious transaction reporting.
V. The Money Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (MLSA).
In 1994 Congress enacted the latest amendment to the BSA with the Money
Laundering Suppression Act of 1994 (MLSA). 194 The accomplishments of the MLSA can
essentially be divided into three different categories: (i) promoting a transformation of
currency transaction reporting under the BSA; (ii) making amendments to effect closer
scrutiny of money transmitting businesses; and (iii) exerting a new emphasis on structur-
ing by augmenting the civil penalties and adding criminal penalties attendant to such
activity. 195
189. Id. Note also that 31 U.S.C. §5323 provides for rewards up to U.S. $150,000 for information lead-
ing to a criminal fine, civil penalty, or forfeiture of more than U.S. $50,000 in connection with a
BSA violation. U.S. Lures Laundering Whistleblowers With Rewards, Protection, Money
Laundering Alert, June 1, 1995, at 3. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(B) allows whistleblowers
to be rewarded out of the Justice Department's asset forfeiture fund if they provide information
"relating to violation" of the money laundering, cash reporting, and structuring laws. Id.
190. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) (1995).
191. Id.
192. Comptroller of the Currency, Handbook on Bank Secrecy Act 7 (1996).
193. Id at 7-8.
194. Money Laundering Suppression Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325 (1994) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5313
(1995). The MLSA was enacted as part of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103 325 (1994).
195. In § 409, the MLSA also brings Indian gaming operations within the purview of BSA scrutiny.
Money Laundering Suppression Act § 409.
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First and foremost, the MLSA embodies an attempt by Congress to redefine its
approach at assailing money laundering with an injection of efficiency and common sense.
Arriving at the realization that the most effective watchdog on money laundering is not a
detached central agency but the financial institutions themselves, Congress used the MLSA
to streamline its attack by both giving the regulated entities more responsibility to detect
money laundering activities and by allowing them to economize the reporting they have to
make. The new approach is capacitated by the revision of the way currency transactions
are reported under the BSA.
The stated objectives of the transformation of CTR filings are to: (i) reduce the bur-
den involved with filing; (ii) limit the requirement for CTRs to transactions in which the
benefit from the reporting outweighs the burdens involved; (iii) concentrate the currency
transaction reporting system on transactions of interest to law enforcement and regulators;
and (iv) create a workable exemption system. 196 In the MLSA, these objectives are
addressed through a reform of the exemptions from CTR filing requirements and a simpli-
fication of the CTR forms that must be filed.
Section 402 of the MLSA provides new exemptions for CTR filings by depository
institutions. 197 The Act not only provides for the mandatory exemption of certain trans-
actions in section 5313(d), it also extends a level of freedom to depository institutions by
allowing them discretionary exemptions under section 5313(e). Under section 5313(d),
depository institutions no longer need to file a CTR for a transaction conducted with: (i)
other depository institutions;198 (ii) governmental departments or agencies or entities
exercising authority on behalf of a government; or (iii) any businesses for which a CTR fil-
ing would "have little or no value for law enforcement purposes".199 The relevant Interim
Rule issued by the FinCEN2°° limits the mandatory exemptions to corporations whose
196. Amendments to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations -- Exemptions From the Requirement to
Report Transactions in Currecy, 31 C.F.R § 103,61 Fed. Reg. 18204, 18205 (1996).
197. Money Laundering Suppression Act § 402. As defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5313(g) (1995), a deposito-
ry institution includes: (i) any branch, agency, or commercial lending company; (ii) any corpo-
ration chartered under section 25A of the Federal Reserve Act; and (iii) any corporation having
an agreement or undertaking with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System under
section 25 of the Federal Reserve Act.
198. The Interim Rule governing these exemptions refers to banks rather than depository institutions.
Interim Rule 61 Fed. Reg. at 18206. This reference is because FinCEN has decided the bank offi-
cials who work with the BSA are more likely to understand the term bank and that since bank as
defined by 31 C.F.R. § 301.11(c) includes all the categories of institutions falling within the defin-
ition of depository institution the distinction between the two terms is really one of preference.
Id. In addition, the exemption is limited to U.S. banks, and a transfer of currency between a for-
eign bank and domestic bank still necessitates the filing of a CTR. I& at n.3.
199. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(d)(1)(D) (1995). At least once a year, the Treasury will publish a list of entities
qualifying for mandatory exemptions in the Federal Register. Id. at § 6313(d)(2).
200. FinCEN is a Treasaury Department agency established in 1990 and designated as a primary organi-
zation to "formulate, oversee and implement policies to prevent and detect money laundering, serv-
ing as the link between the law enforcement, financial and regulatory communities." FINCEN, THE
GLOBAL FIGHT AGANST MONEY LAUNDERING 3 (199?). Furthermore, FinCEN has been in charge of
the Office of Financial Enforcement as of November 1994. Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering The
Scope of the Problem andAttempts to CombatI 63 TENN. L REv. 143,181-182 (1995).
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common stock: (i) is listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the American Stock
Exchange (but not including stock listed on the Emerging Company Marketplace of the
American Stock Exchange) or (ii) is designated as a Nasdaq National Market Security list-
ed on the Nasdaq Stock Market (but not including stock listed under the separate "Nasdaq
Small-Cap Issues" category.)20 1 In effect, these mandatory exemptions help eliminate
superfluous reporting on transactions likely to be otherwise reported or not likely to be,
vehicles for money laundering activities.202
In addition, discretionary exemptions are available for transactions between deposito-
ry institutions and "a qualified business customer of the institution on the basis of infor-
mation submitted to the Secretary [of the Treasury] by the institution in accordance with
procedures [and guidelines established by Treasury regulation] ."203 For purposes of this
discretionary exemption, a qualified business customer is an entity which: (i) maintains a
transaction account; (ii) frequently engages in transactions requiring a CTR filing; and (iii)
meets the Treasury's criteria for the exemption. 20 4
Importantly, depository institutions are provided with a safe harbor preventing them
from being liable for failing to file under the mandatory or discretionary exemptions
unless they knowingly file false or incomplete information or have reason to believe the
transaction did not fall within the exemption. 205 This provision is intended to allow banks
the security necessary to ensure a workable exemption system upon which they can rely.
The relationship the MLSA's exemptions share with the suspicious activity reporting
mandated by the Annunzio-Wylie Act is useful to note. The exemptions in the MLSA do
not apply to the filing of SARs; suspect transactions must be reported regardless of the
entity involved. The correlation between the two provisions is best described by FinCEN
itself: The substitution of suspicious transaction reporting for routine reporting of all cur-
rency transactions by exempt persons in effect defines what a routine transaction for an
exempt person is. A routine currency transaction, in the case of an exempt person, is a
transaction not triggering the suspicious transaction reporting requirements, because the
transaction does not, for example, give the bank a reason to suspect money laundering, a
violation of a reporting requirement, or the absence of a business purpose.206
In addition, the MLSA simplifies the actual CTR form itself.207 The statute directs the
Treasury to take measures to "redesign the format of the reports . . . to eliminate the need
to report information which has little or no value for law enforcement purposes" and to
"reduce the time and effort required to prepare such report[s] for filing by any such financial
institution.... "208 Effective October 1, 1995, the new CTR form requires only the most basic
information, such as who conducted the transaction, for whom the transaction was conduct-
ed, where the transaction occurred, and a description of and the amount of the transac-
201. Interim Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. at 18207.
202. Kathryn Keneally, Congress Loosens Supreme Court's Interpretation of 'Specific Intent, 82 J. TAX'N
110, 112-113 (1995).
203. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(e)(I) (1995).
204. Id. at § 5313(e)(2).
205. Id. at § 5313(f).
206. Interim Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 18204,18205 (1996) (referencing 31 C.F.R. § 103.21(a)(2)(i)-(iii)).
207. See Money Laudering Suppression Act, § 402(c).
208. Id.
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tion.209 The new form represents a 30 percent reduction in the information required to be
reported.210 As many as six data fields were removed from the form, allowing the reporting
financial institutions to save thousands of work hours filling out the CTRs. 211
Complementing the aforementioned provisions effectively transforming the CTR fil-
ing procedure, the MLSA provides for the improvement of federal banking regulatory
agency money laundering identification schemes. 212 This provision serves to open the
lines of cooperation between depository institutions and law enforcement agencies and to
establish a public private partnership in identifying money laundering operations. The
provision encourages depository institutions to develop better methods of detecting and
reporting money launderers and instructs regulators to ensure the periodic distribution of
informational updates on money laundering strategies and operations to the banking
industry.2 13
Second, the MLSA further amends the BSA by bringing closer scrutiny upon money
transmitting businesses. 214 With the addition of section 5330, all money transmitting
businesses are now required to register with the U.S. Treasury.21 5 Although the form and
manner of registration is provided by Treasury regulation, 2 16 the statute does specify the
registration forms must contain: (i) the name and address of the money transmitting busi-
ness, of those who direct the business, and of the depository institution where the business
maintains a transaction account; (ii) estimates of the volume of business expected to be
conducted by the particular institution within the following year; and (iii) any other infor-
mation the Treasury might prescribe.2 17
Supporting the registration requirements is a civil penalty of $5000 for each failure to file
a registration form.218 As every day a business does not file is considered another violation,
209. Treasury Press Release, Treasury Issues Revised Currency Transaction Report (CTR), Reducing
Regulatory Burden on Financial Institutions, May 10, 1995.
210. Id.
211. New CTR Will Take Effect October 1, Money Landering Alert, May 1, 1995, available at 1995 WL
8353462.
212. Money Laundering Suppression Act § 404.
213. Id.
214. Id. at § 408. The purpose of this section is "to establish a registration requirement for businesses
engaged in providing check cashing, currency exchange, or money transmitting or remittance
services, or issuing or redeeming money orders, travelers' checks, and other similar instruments
to assist the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and other supervisory and law
enforcement agencies to effectively enforce the criminal, tax, and regulatory laws and prevent
such money transmitting businesses from engaging in illegal activities." Id at § 408(a)(2).
215. 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (1995). As defined in section 5330(d), a "money transmitting business" includes
any business (other than the U.S. Post Office) that:
(A) provides check cashing, currency exchange, or money transmitting or remittance services,
or issues or redeems money orders, travelers' checks, and other similar instruments;
(B) is required to file reports under section 5313; and
(C) is not a depository institution (as defined in section 5313(g)).
Id at § 5330(d).
216. Id.
217. Id. at § 5330(b).
218. Id. at § 5330(e). Filing false or materially incomplete information on the registration form is
considered a failure to file. Id. at § 5330(a)(4).
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the civil fines may become quite substantial in a relatively short period of time. 219
Furthermore, violators of the provision may also be subject to a criminal penalty of up to five
years imprisonment, in addition to the accompanying criminal forfeiture consequences.220
In addition, the MLSA incorporates a note into section 5311 advocating the states
adopt a uniform law to combat money laundering. 221 Included within the proposed
Model Statute are licensing requirements and standards for money transmitting business-
es, reporting requirements for such businesses, procedures for ensuring compliance with
the federal cash transaction reporting requirements, and criminal penalties for operating a
money transmitting business without a license. 222
Third, the MLSA reforms and strengthens the penalties for structuring transactions to
avoid the BSA reporting requirements. The MLSA adds a criminal penalty for structuring
to section 5324 providing for a fine and up to five years imprisonment for a violation. 223
These penalties are doubled for individuals or institutions convicted of structuring in con-
nection with another illegal activity or for whom a pattern of any illegal activity involving
over $100,000 and lasting for more than a year can be established. 224
Congress also implemented provisions in the MLSA to address issues raised by the
U.S. Supreme Court in its opinion in Ratzlaf.225 Congress eliminated the word willfully
from the civil penalty provisions of 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(4)(A), which serves to ease the
burden on prosecutors presented with violations of the BSA anti-structuring provisions in
particular and violations of the BSA reporting requirements in general. 226 The govern-
ment need now only demonstrate the defendant acted knowingly and with the intent to
evade the reporting requirements of the BSA in order to obtain a sustainable conviction
under the anti-structuring provisions. 227
VI. Conclusion.
The United States' goal of combatting international money laundering will be best
served through cooperation efforts with the governments of foreign countries. Some
recent unilateral measures taken by the United States, however, may prove fruitful. For
example, in February 1995 President Clinton certified certain countries that have, in the
past, been the source of much of the illicit drug traffic in the United States, but which
recently ave been improving. These were countries that either: (i) cooperated fully with
219. See id. at § 5330(e)(2).
220. Id.
221. See id. at§ 5311.
222. Id.
223. Money Laundering Suppression Act § 41 l(a).
224. Id.
225. Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 655 (1994) (holding a conviction under the anti-structuring
law requires a showing the defendant not only intentionally structured transactions to avoid
reporting requirements, but also did so knowing this activity was illegal).
226. See id.
227. See id.
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the United States or took adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the
goals and objectives of the 1988 Vienna Convention; and (ii) that were determined to be in
the vital national interests of the United States to receive U.S. monetary aid to combat drug
trafficking and money laundering. The President also disclosed those countries not meet-
ing the standards for such certification: Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Syria and Nigeria. 228
In addition, when President Clinton issued the 1996 certification, Colombia had been
notably placed on the black list of those countries not meeting U.S. standards.229 Perhaps
discovering a carrot is sometimes more effective than a stick, the U.S. Government is
attempting to see whether a dangling aid package can serve as an added incentive for cer-
tain developing countries to begin to address such issues as drug trafficking and money
laundering.
228. See Certifications for Major Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries, 60 Fed. Reg. 12, 859
(1995). For a review and assessment of the certification program under the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, as amended, see Assessment of U.S. Counternarcotics Effors in Asia, 6 U.S. Dept. of
State Dispatch 619 (Aug. 7, 1995); International Narcotics Control Efforts in the Western
Hemisphere, 6 U.S. Dept. of State Dispatch 337 (Apr. 17, 1995).
229. See Certification For Major Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries, 61 Fed. Reg. 9, 891
(1996) (determining that Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia, Iran, Nigeria, and Syria are major pro-
ducing and/or major transit countries not meeting the Foreign Assistance standards).
